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This paper presents historical trends in life expectancy in the United Kingdom 
and  other  countries  and  discusses  how  these  trends  might  evolve  over  the 
coming decades. The paper argues that the expected increases in longevity are 
likely to have significant implications for the structure of pension systems in the 
future.  Individuals,  businesses  and  governments  have  already  responded  to 
these  expected  increases  –  for  example  by  working  longer,  closing  defined-
benefit pension schemes or introducing parametric reforms to the state pension 
system – and are likely to change their behaviours further in the future. The 
issue is complicated by the fact that future longevity trends are uncertain. This 
makes it more difficult to allocate longevity risk efficiently and fairly across the 
different economic agents, while making it also more difficult to guarantee the 
sustainability  of  the  system  overall.  The  paper  shows  though  that  innovative 
solutions  to  this  challenge  are  being  developed,  from  businesses  moving 
towards  hybrid  defined-benefit/defined-contribution  pension  schemes,  to 
governments  introducing  mechanisms  which  automatically  split  the  financial 
burden  arising  from  future  increases  in  life  expectancy  between  state  and 
individual, to businesses taking advantage of new products being developed to 




i.  Introduction 
The rapid increase in life expectancy is without doubt one of the great achievements of 
the human race over the previous two centuries. It has not only transformed individual 
lives, it has also profoundly transformed societies. These increases have been 
experienced in most societies, with the most marked changes taking place in the 
developed world, while more modest gains have been made in the majority of 
developing countries. 
 
Life expectancy is one of the three so-called vital parameters to generate population 
projections. The other two are fertility rates and net migration. All three also matter for 
the provision of pensions. Longevity matters directly because it determines, in 
combination with the time of entry into retirement, how long someone can expect to 
receive a pension. The time of entry into retirement generally coincides with an exit 
from the labour market. 
 
Fertility rates and net migration matter indirectly because they affect the size of the 
working-age population. For example, with the number of people aged 65 years and 
over increasing rapidly in most developed countries, the long-term sustainability of so-
called state pay-as-you-go (unfunded) pension systems depends crucially on a 
government’s ability to raise taxes, which in turn depends on the size of the economy 
and hence also the size of the workforce. The future size of the economy also matters 
for the ability of defined-contribution pension schemes to deliver prosperity for 
pensioners in the future. This is because the future profitability of businesses will 
depend on market opportunities. At its most basic, market opportunities depend on the 
number of people who can purchase products and services. 
 
Setting up an efficient, fair and sustainable pension system is a major challenge and 
might never fully be achieved. The challenge is made larger still by the fact that 
longevity trends – and hence one of the key parameters determining the size of the 
challenge – are not well understood. Actual increases in life expectancy have generally 
been much more substantial than previously assumed in official population projections, 
with the result that government, business, the financial markets and individuals had to 
readjust their behaviours and plans. 
 
It should, therefore, be a priority to improve the understanding of future longevity 
trends. For individuals, increased longevity is desirable and not surprisingly, there-fore, 
most developed societies spend a significant percentage of GDP annually on healthcare 
and medical research to ensure that we all have longer and healthier lives. As the 
population ages, this share is projected to increase over the coming decades and 
governments will have to ensure that the public finances will remain sustainable and 
government policy inter-generationally fair. Equally, increases in longevity can lead to 
large unanticipated retirement costs for business and governments. 
 
Consequently, this paper focuses on longevity. The following section discusses 
historical trends in life expectancy, the main drivers of these trends, which have 
changed over the last century, and what impact these changes had on society more 
generally. The section also presents the evolution of the official UK population 
projections over recent decades. Section III discusses the effect of and potential 
responses by individuals, businesses and governments to increased longevity. As in our 
earlier paper on the economic landscape of pensions provision, we argue that these 
responses could be assessed in terms of their impact on the efficiency, equity and 
affordability of a society’s pension system.
1 The identification of desirable responses 
might also indicate whether existing institutional structures or markets perform 
optimally. Section IV argues that the uncertainty of future longevity trends adds 
another layer of complexity over an already complicated issue and that it is therefore 
useful to improve our understanding of these trends. The paper shows the different 
 
1 Pensions Tomorrow A White Paper, Frank Eich and Amarendra Swarup, 2008 at 




options individuals, businesses and governments have to address the challenges 
created by this inevitable uncertainty. 
ii.  Historical developments  
Trends in life expectancy 
Human life expectancy averaged around 40 years for centuries and only started to 
increase significantly in the 19
th century. It has been on an upward trajectory ever 
since. At the beginning of the 20
th century, (female) life expectancy had risen to 
around 60 years in New Zealand; by mid century, the strongest performing countries 
were the Nordics (with an average life expectancy of around 75 years); and towards 
the end of the previous century, it was Japan (with a life expectancy of around 80 
years). While the frontrunners in terms of life expectancy have changed over time, one 
intriguing feature of the change in life expectancy is that it has more or less followed a 
linear trend since the beginning of the 20
th century (see Chart 1). The picture has been 






























Chart 2 shows the evolution of life expectancy at birth between 1950 and 2050 
(projected) in a number of selected countries. The chart shows that the most marked 
increases in the second half of the previous century could be found in China and in 
India, with Japan defining the upper bound internationally since the 1960s. Out of the 
countries shown, only Russia (or more precisely the former Soviet Union) experienced 
periods over the last 50 years during which life expectancy at birth actually dropped. 
However, the United Nations expects that life expectancy at birth will in-crease in all of 
the selected countries over the coming decades, with India and China gradually 






2 The assumed increases in life expectancy at birth are not limited to the countries shown in the chart. The 
United Nations expects life expectancy at birth to increase in nearly all countries over the coming decades. 
See the Appendix for a more detailed list of demographic trends in selected countries. 
   Chart 1: Female life expectancy in years 
 
 
   Reprinted from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bv.fcgi?rid=dcp2.figgrp.100 
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However, it is important to understand that these increases were not simply the result 
of increases in maximum life expectancy. The major increases in life expectancy in the 
past were mainly the result of reduced infant mortality, which led to the 
“rectangularisation” of life expectancy as a growing proportion of a cohort reached 
older age, as can be seen in the example of the British population given in Chart 3. The 
chart shows that the biggest change took place in the first half of the last century with 
the dramatic reduction in infant mortality: while a quarter of the population died before 
the age of 10 years in 1901, within less than two generations that had been pushed 
out to around 65 years. Similar developments can be found in most other developed 
countries. 
 
As Chart 3 shows, in 1851 half of the British population survived to around 45 years, 
by 1901 that had increased to close to 60 years, by 1951 to around 75 years and by 
2001, to more than 80 years. However, the “rectangularisation” does not necessarily 
mean that maximum life expectancy has increased. For example, the 
“rectangularisation” would be complete once every person reaches the limit of life 
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Chart 4 shows the underlying mortality trends, which have led to the 
“rectangularisation” of the population over the last century. Mortality rates have been 
falling for all age groups but particularly strongly for infants. However, rates for the 
latter group have converged towards zero and there is not much scope left for further 
reductions. Mortality rates for those between 1 and 64 years and 65 and 74 years have 
also fallen gradually but as the chart shows rates for the former age group have been 
very low throughout the 20th century and as such there is also little scope for further 
reductions. Mortality rates for those aged 65 to 74 years have fallen very steadily over 
the last century, reaching around 20 per 1000 population in 2001-05; half of what it 
was in the 1950s and a third of what it was 90 years earlier. 
 
Despite this decline, there is scope for a further reduction. Finally, the chart shows that 
the mortality rate – not surprisingly – is highest for those aged 75 years and over, 
which suggests that the scope for further reductions should be greatest for this age 
group. The chart also shows that the decline in the mortality rate for this age group 










































The dramatic decline in infant mortality over the first half of the last century continued 
a trend, which had already started a few decades earlier. In 1901, for example, infant 
mortality still stood at around 160 per 1000 births; as Chart 4 shows that had dropped 
to 110 within ten years.
3 Partly as a result of the sharp decline in infant mortality rates, 
fertility rates also started to fall rapidly, which in turn had dramatic effects on the role 
of females in society generally and the labour market in particular. 
Longevity and societal change  
Increases in life expectancy and the fact that more people reach old age (see Chart 5) 
have also changed fundamentally how individuals think and feel about age. In the 
developed world, many people in their 60s, 70s and even 80s nowadays enjoy a health 
status (and also financial means), which allows them to engage in activities, which only 
a generation or two ago would have generally been limited to younger adults. The fact 
that the share of people aged 65 years and over or 85 years and over in total 
population has increased substantially too over the previous decades also had a 
profound impact on society. 
 
Females have also postponed child birth to later age. For example, in 1977 the 
probability for females aged between 25 and 29 years to give birth was twice as high 
as that for females aged 30 to 34 years. By 2007, the latter group had the highest 
fertility rate of any age group.
4 As a result, nearly as many females in the UK now give 
birth in their 30s than in their 20s.
5 
 
Equally, the average number of years people stay in formal education has also gone 







4 www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?ID=951  
5 www.gad.gov.uk/Demography_Data/Population/2006/uk/wuk06asfr.xls 
    Chart 4: Mortality rates by age (England and Wales) 
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While the notion of what constitutes “old age” has shifted dramatically over the past 
decades and while the average entry age into the labour market has risen steadily in 
most developed countries, the effective retirement age of the workforce did not rise in 
line. In fact, in many developed countries, including the UK, labour market 
participation rates of older male workers generally trended downwards between the 
early 1970s and early 1990s, partly as a result of the deep structural changes that 
were taking place in those economies over that time.
6 By contrast, participation rates 
of older females have generally trended up as the role of females in society changed. 
In the UK these developments have meant that subsequent cohorts have spent smaller 
proportions of their life in work. For example, the cohort born in 1900 spent nearly 70 
per cent of their lives in the labour market, that share had dropped to less than 60 per 
cent for those born in 1935.
7 
 
The aggregate trends discussed so far conceal substantial variations across social 
classes, gender or regions. For example, while projected male life expectancy at birth 
increased from 69.2 years for those born in 1972-76 to 75.4 years for those born in 
1997-2001 (+6.2 years or +9 per cent), the absolute and proportional increase is 
substantially larger for males in Social Class I than for males in Social Class V. For the 
former the increases are +7½ years (+10.4 per cent), for the latter +4½ years (+6.9 
per cent).
8 The trends are different for females: with life expectancy for females in 
Social Class I projected to increase by less than for females in Social Class V. 
 
In the context of pensions, future trends in life expectancy at age 65 years are if any-
thing more important than at birth. Chart 6 shows that between 1981 and 2001 male 
(cohort) life expectancy at age 65 years increased by around five years and that for 
 
6 Retirement in the UK, James Bank and Sarah Smith, CMPO Working Paper Series No 06/140, 2006. Also 
see Social security programs and retirement around the world, Jonathan Gruber and David Wise, Research in 
Labor Economics, 1999. 
7 Retirement in the UK, James Bank and Sarah Smith, CMPO Working Paper Series No 06/140, 2006, page 3. 
8  Review  of  methods  for  estimating  life  expectancy  by  social  class  using  the  ONS  Longitudinal  Study,  Brian 
Johnson and Louisa Blackwell, Office for National Statistics, Health Statistics Quarterly 2007. The figures shown 




females by slightly less.
9 In other words cohort life expectancy increased by roughly 
three months for every year during that period. The latest set of official population 
projections for the UK assumes that the increase will continue in the future too, albeit 
at a slower pace. For example, National Statistics projects that male life expectancy at 
age 65 years will reach 25 years by mid century, around 30 years (and hence one 
generation) later than females. 
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Chart 7 shows that male cohort life expectancy at age 65 years is projected to in-
crease in all the nations of the UK – England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland – 
but also that existing differences in levels are if anything expected to remain. For 
example, cohort life expectancy in 1981 was one year lower in Scotland than in Eng-
land, by 2056 that gap is projected to widen to 1.3 years. 
 
 
9 One can distinguish between the so-called “cohort” and “period” life expectancies. The former includes any 
potential gains in life expectancy; the latter is based on today’s life expectancy for the different ages. As 




Chart 7: Cohort life expectancy at age 65
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As more people reach old age, the question of what might be the theoretical maxi-
mum life span for a human has become more pertinent. Different views have been 
expressed on this issue. For example, it has been suggested that increases in longevity 
will not remain linear but will instead gradually become smaller and hence converge 
towards zero.
10 A still more pessimistic view is that life expectancy has actually peaked 
and that lifestyle changes in western societies (for example due to in-creased 
prevalence of obesity) will more than offset the potential positive effects of medial and 
other progress on life expectancy.
11 On the other extreme of the spectrum, a number 




The future path of the life expectancy trend is a crucial unknown in a number of 
important policy debates, including that on pensions.
13 Governments, businesses and 
individuals have to prepare for the economic, societal and financial implications of an 
ageing society. For example, it has been estimated that pension liabilities increase by 3 
per cent or more for every added year of life expectancy. Other important policy areas 
affected include future health and long-term care provision and the built environment. 
Dealing with pensions is a complex issue as it is, given the different and often 
conflicting objectives of different stakeholders and constraints involved; the large 
degree of uncertainty regarding one of the key parameters makes the issue 
substantially more complex still. Having a thorough understanding of the actual ageing 
trends would be useful for all agents involved as it could minimise the cost of future 
adjustments in behaviours as new information emerges. 
 
Chart 8 shows the projected trends in period life expectancy for males as presented in 
the 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 and 2006 UK population projections. The chart shows that 
the latest (2006-based) population projections represent a step change in terms of the 
 
10 The Hidden Age Revolution: Emergent Integration of All Ages, Matilda White Riley, 1998. 
11 See for example www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bv.fcgi?rid=hstat4.section.1107 and 
www.munichre.com/en/ts/biosciences/will_obesity_halt_trend_of_increasing_longevity/default.aspx 
12 Brave Old World, Tom Kirkwood, BBC Reith Lecture 1, 2001. 




(period) life expectancy assumption used. Previous projections assumed that future 
increases in life expectancy would gradually decline over time (converging to zero 
eventually), the latest projections assume a sustained increase.
14 
 
Chart 8: Period life expectancy
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iii.  Longevity trends and pension systems  
The Pensions Tomorrow White Paper introduced three desirable characteristics, against 
which a pensions system could be judged.
15 These characteristics are:  
 
·  Efficiency (static and dynamic) 
·  Equity (fairness) 
·  Affordability and sustainability (both financial and social). 
 
As mentioned earlier, setting up an efficient, fair and sustainable pension system is a 
major challenge and might never fully be achieved. The challenge is made larger still 
by the fact that longevity trends – and hence one of the key parameters determining 
the size of the challenge – are not well understood. Actual increases in life expectancy 
have generally been much more substantial than previously assumed in official 
population projections, with the result that government, business, the financial 
markets and individuals had to readjust their behaviours and plans. In hindsight, 
previous behaviours also turned out to be suboptimal. 
 
Though desirable from an individual and societal perspective, increased longevity can 
also adversely affect important aspects of the economy, particularly when it comes to 
pension provision and healthcare. As an example, in the United States Social Security, 
 
14 A more general discussion of the overall accuracy of national population projections in the UK can be found 
in Fifty years of United Kingdom population projections: how accurate have they been?, Chris Shaw, Office 
for National Statistics Population Trends 128, www.gad.gov.uk/Documents/Population_Trends_128.pdf  




Medicare and Medicaid accounted for 8½ per cent of GDP in 2007 but is projected to 
more than double to 18 per cent by 2050.
16 
 
Equally, increases in longevity can lead to large unanticipated costs for business and 
there is substantial evidence that this is adversely affecting the finances of defined 
benefit pension funds and their sponsors. Over the last decade, new accounting 
standards have greatly increased transparency with respect to the effects of in-creased 
longevity on pension fund finances. Many occupational pension funds are also at risk 
due to the presence of spousal benefits should the main beneficiary die, which can 
enhance the longevity of the fund.
17 
 
Sponsors and trustees are increasingly concerned about longevity as the recent trend 
for life expectancies has been ever upwards and to make things more complicated, the 
extent of future increases is also highly uncertain. Another fundamental problem is that 
for most schemes, liabilities are calculated insufficiently frequently, using out of date 
longevity assumptions and increasing the risk of unexpected future increases in 
liabilities. In recent times, the area has become all the more important because of 
increased regulatory scrutiny in the UK and elsewhere, and growing pressure for 
schemes, for example from The Pensions Regulator, to adopt more realistic mortality 
assumptions that reflect the latest scientific evidence. In the UK this also presents 
additional short-term risks for corporate sponsors as they may need to divert 
potentially vital cash-flow into the scheme to meet these future liabilities. 
 
Dealing with this risk and its consequences has hitherto been far from straightforward 
and more research is needed to understand the issues better. The role financial 
markets can play in managing and mitigating this risk is also deserving of further 
study. The growth of a robust market in catastrophe bonds over the recent past to deal 
with the risk from natural and man-made disasters is evidence that idiosyncratic but 
crippling risks can be managed effectively. Recently, steps have been taken with 
companies launching longevity indices and hedging products. Fundamentally, who 
should carry the longevity risk and does the allocation of this risk make a difference to 
the dynamic efficiency of the economy? Can longevity risk be hedged effectively and 
can firms be actually effectively insured against future longevity increases by the 
financial markets? 
 
It is likely that having greater information regarding one of the key vital parameters – 
longevity - should allow one to design ex ante a more efficient and fairer pension sys-
tem, which would also be financially and socially sustainable. 
 
As Chart 9 shows individuals, businesses and governments can respond in a number of 
ways to expected increases in longevity (note that the chart provides a non-exhaustive 
















16 The long-term budget outlook and options for slowing the growth of health care costs, Congressional 
Budget Office, June 2008. 
17 For example, the American Civil War Veterans Pension Fund made its last payment in 2001, nearly 140 































Individuals, for example, could in theory accept a lower annual pension as the 
accumulated assets (savings) will have to be spread over a longer period of time in old 
age. Alternatively, individuals could decide to extend their working lives in response to 
an increase in longevity or save more during their working lives, as would be 
suggested by the so-called life cycle model.
18 The life-cycle model is one of the key 
tools with which economists analyse individual life-time consumption and saving 
behaviours. According to the model, people save when young to build up financial 
assets, which can then be disinvested again in old age to finance consumption. In a 
world of certainty, individuals can optimise their savings/consumption and labour 
market behaviour (e.g. timing of retirement) to maximise life-time welfare. 
 
Businesses  
Businesses have dealt with the expected increases in longevity in numerous ways, 
including by increasing contribution rates or by reducing the generosity of future 
pension promises. More fundamentally, businesses in the UK and elsewhere have also 
started to close defined benefit (DB) pension schemes to new entrants and by shifting 
pension provision on to a defined contribution basis. Up to the 1990s, defined benefit 
pension schemes were the prevalent type of pension scheme offered in the UK private 
sector. In other words, many businesses have dealt with the challenges arising from 
future longevity trends by shifting the burden away from themselves to their 
employees. It has been argued that individuals are in fact relatively badly placed to 
deal with these challenges on their own so that the shift might not have raised societal 
welfare. There is also the important issue of future pensioner poverty to be considered. 
 
However, defined benefit pension funds remain an important issue for many companies 
and pension fund trustees. Corporate managers are faced with the problem of 
maintaining a set of financial commitments made in the past, when assumptions for 
example regarding future longevity trends were very different. Meeting these 
commitments will depend on the financial well-being of the corporate sponsor, which is 
nowadays legally required to underwrite any deficit.
19 At the same time, pension fund 
 
18 The government can influence these decisions by changing financial incentives (e.g. in-come tax rates) or 
by changing legislation (e.g. anti age-discrimination legislation). 
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Chart 9: Possible responses to increased longevity
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trustees try to pursue the appropriate investment strategies, taking account of in-
creasing longevity exposure and the financial robustness of their corporate sponsor. 
Not surprisingly, trustees and beneficiaries of defined benefit pension funds feel secure 
when the sponsor of their fund is making good profits, and rather insecure when it is 
not. 
 
There is also the issue of growing tensions between shareholders and pension scheme 
members. Management teams, with their primary responsibility to share-holders – 
typically including other pension schemes as well – make necessary and in some cases 
risky decisions that affect the direction of their companies. The result is that the shape 
of the sponsor of a pension fund today may be markedly different to that of the 
company that initiated it. Pension funds, and the beneficiaries who rely upon them, are 
often at the mercy of these changes. This can create unhealthy tension and lead to 
trustees treating the sponsor as little more than the prime debtor to the pension fund. 
Such an attitude is harmful for all concerned: sponsors may be distracted from their 
core business and restricted in terms of their corporate goals, ultimately impacting the 
funding position of the pension fund. 
 
There is an additional complication. The horizon of success in which most companies 
operate is at most five or ten years distant. Yet, as their pension funds need a much 
longer perspective, these corporate sponsors are also charged with maintaining open-
ended commitments for a very long period ahead. Some will still be paying out benefits 
in 50 or 60 years’ time, depending on the longevity of their members, even if they 
closed their schemes to new entrants now. Corporate sponsors that initiated de-fined 
benefit pension funds in an earlier generation also may now suddenly find their balance 
sheets at the mercy of volatile markets. This can have dramatic effects on their share 
price, their room for corporate manoeuvre and, in the end, on the security of the 
commitments they are pledged to maintain. 
 
Governments 
Increases in longevity, the ageing of the baby boom cohorts and declining workforces 
due to low fertility rates will lead to a marked increase in the so-called old-age de-
pendency ratio in most developed countries over the coming decades.
20 Faced with 
these demographic developments and their potential adverse effects on the long-term 
sustainability of the public finances; many governments implemented policies over 
recent years with the objective of reducing the generosity of state pensions in the 
future. These policies have come in many different shapes. For example, governments 
have shifted the indexation of future pension increases from earnings to prices or 
moved the earnings-related pension formula from final salary to career-average. Many 
governments also announced to increase the official retirement age over the coming 
decades from which on future pensioners can claim a state pension. These policies 
were complemented by measures aimed at strengthening occupational and private 
pensions (the so-called second and third pillars of pension provision) to ensure the 
adequacy of retirement incomes in the future.
21 
 
Faced with a rapidly rising number of older people in the future (partly but not only 
due to increases in longevity), governments have also opted to consolidate the public 
finances over recent years. Denmark, Sweden and Finland, for example, reduced their 
gross debt to GDP ratios and accumulated financial assets (mainly in pension funds) in 
an effort to create some “fiscal space” in the years ahead. Australia, New Zealand and 
Canada pursued similar policies over recent years.
22 This fiscal consolidation can at 
least help to deal with the financial implications of the ageing baby boom cohorts. 
 
20 The demographic old-age dependency ratio is generally defined as the number of people aged 65 years 
and over relative to the number of people aged between 16 and 64 years. The economic old-age dependency 
ratio replaces the arbitrary age of 65 years with the state pension age. See Eurostat for the latest population 
projections for EU Member States. 
21 As part of its 2003 reforms, for example, the German government introduced the so-called Riester Rente, 
which offers financial incentives to encourage individuals to save for their own retirement. Similar policies 
were implemented in a number of other countries. 





While all the above responses (besides others) are feasible, what effect might they 
have on their own or in combination on the efficiency, equity and affordability 
(sustainability) of a country’s pension system or economy more generally? A related 
question is whether existing institutions and market structures, among other things, 
are in the position to enable society to achieve an efficient, equitable and affordable 
outcome. For example, are existing labour market structures and pension age 
legislation flexible enough to allow individuals to make optimal choices given the 
diversity in individual circumstances and preferences? 
iv.  Understanding and dealing with the uncertainty of longevity 
trends  
Stochastic projections  
The previous section illustrated the choices available to society to achieve an efficient, 
fair and affordable pension system in the light of certain increases in longevity. In 
reality though the future increases in longevity are far from certain. 
 
In an effort to develop a better understanding of the uncertainties surrounding future 
longevity trends, actuaries and other population forecasters have started to 
complement their more traditional “deterministic” approach to projecting future 
population trends with stochastic projections. In these projections the key parameters 
– longevity, fertility and migration flows – are shocked at random to generate 
projections. While this approach allows for the explicit quantification of the 
uncertainties involved, the parameters will still be centred on pre-determined baseline 
assumptions. 
Potential drivers of future longevity trends  
Over the last few years there have also been major efforts to improve the scientific 
foundation underlying the assumptions. For example, in 2008 the Mortality Research 
Steering Group of the Institute of Actuaries commissioned a scoping note on mortality 
research across the professions.
23 This and similar initiatives could help to establish the 
links between, for example, medical progress and future life expectancy trends. More 
generally, what could be the impact of past, current and future: 
 
·  medical progress 
·  new health and safety regulation 
·  lifestyle changes (e.g. obesity) 
·  technological progress 
·  socio-economic changes such as migration and economic growth 
·  pandemics 
·  climate change 
·  labour market developments (e.g. sectoral changes) 
 
on life expectancy and healthy life expectancy? 
 
Assessing the potential implications of these developments for longevity will inevitably 
involve a high degree of uncertainty, which will increase the further the projection 
horizon. For example, the exact medical progress over the coming decades is unknown 
but current developments might yield insights into what might be achieved over the 
coming years. In a number of areas there might be an emerging consensus that a 
number of important breakthroughs will be made soon, including potentially in the 
treatment of Alzheimer’s. Past patterns of medical progress and the speed of rollout of, 
inter alia, new types of treatment across the general population might also give an 
indication how medical provision might evolve in the foreseeable future. For decades 
 
 
23 Scoping Mortality Research (Report of the Mortality Research Steering Group), presented by Catriona 




further into the future the nature of such assessment will inevitably have to become 
more speculative. 
 
The above-mentioned trends are likely to affect mortality rates at different age groups. 
For example, new health and safety regulation might address health risks at the 
workplace and as such would affect mortality rates of the working-age population. By 
contrast, advances in the treatment of Alzheimer’s will most likely reduce mortality 
rates of the oldest old, in other words those above 85 years of age. 
 
The issue is complicated by the interdependencies of the different factors that might 
affect longevity. This is shown in Chart 10. As an illustration consider technological 
progress and climate change: technological progress and climate change might impact 
separately on future longevity trends but technological progress will also impact on 
climate change developments. Similarly, health and safety regulation might affect 
longevity trends and could affect lifestyles, but the latter will also be a driving force for 


























A better understanding of future life expectancy trends would allow society to make 
better decisions in many areas. For example, assuming that increasing life expectancy 
is one of the most desirable outcomes in a society, what is the most cost-effective way 
to achieve these increases? A better understanding of longevity trends would also likely 
yield important insights into trends in healthy life expectancy, which could have many 
other policy implications.
24 People might be living longer, but will they be living longer 
healthier lives too so that working longer is a feasible option? Being able to work for 
longer will be fundamental to making the announced increases in retirement ages, 
which have been announced in many countries, work. There is an additional – indirect 
– link between longevity trends and the labour market: the largest group providing 
informal long-term care services to the very elderly are people – and predominantly 
females - in their late 50s and increasingly early 60s who look after their parents or 






24 See for example Securing good care for older people: Taking a long-term view, Derek Wanless, 2002 and 
Mental Capital and Wellbeing: Making the most of ourselves in the 21st century, Government Office for Science 
(Foresight), 2008 at http://dius.ecgroup.net/files/116-08-FO_b.pdf. 
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Dealing with uncertainty: a challenge for individuals, businesses and 
governments  
The fact that future trends in longevity are uncertain (including for the current 
working-age population) adds a layer of complexity to the longevity issue and poses 
many additional challenges for economic agents – individuals, businesses or 
governments – with which they have to deal with. One of the key challenges is to 
decide ex ante who – individuals, businesses or governments (and hence society at 
large) - should carry the longevity risk. The optimal allocation of this risk should 
depend on an agent’s ability to deal with this risk. 
 
There is a substantial literature on optimisation under uncertainty. For example, it has 
been suggested that faced with uncertain life expectancy and other developments (e.g. 
healthy life expectancy, which affects the ability to work in older age, and the future 
policy environment), risk-averse individuals are likely to conduct precautionary 
savings to prepare for old age.
25 These in turn could lead to sub-optimally high levels 
of inheritance. However, given the time horizons involved, myopia is likely to at least 
partially offset this, with many individuals ultimately saving too little for their own 
retirement. The situation is complicated further by the fact that most individuals make 
decisions based on an incomplete set of information, with individuals often believing 
life expectancy to be shorter than it is in reality. The fact that individuals generally 
underestimate longevity trends will probably accentuate this bias towards under-saving 
(efficiency and affordability). 
 
An individual’s ability to cope with longevity risk (alongside other types of risk, 
including the risks from uncertain investment returns) must be limited though. Unlike 
groups of individuals (either in the form of businesses or governments), individuals 
have no scope to pool risk and would have to deal with any implications on their own. 
Their choice set is also more limited than that for larger groups. For example, 
individuals will generally find it difficult to return to work in old age should they find 
that the pension income they receive (from the state or as an annuity) is inadequate. 
Pre-cautionary saving then appears the only way for individuals to prepare for this 
eventuality. 
 
As mentioned above, businesses can and have responded to increases in life 
expectancy and the resultant increase in the value of the pension entitlements by 
closing defined pension schemes to new entrants and promoting defined contribution 
schemes instead. By moving from DB to DC pension schemes, many businesses have 
been able to shift the entire longevity risk to individuals. 
 
Intermittent solutions can also be found though and have often taken the form of 
hybrid DB/DC schemes. For example, Allied Irish Bank in Ireland announced in 2007 to 
launch a hybrid DB/DC pension scheme for new entrants; which would cap the DB 
benefit at a certain amount; above that amount scheme members would be on a DC 
scheme.
26,27 Similar hybrid schemes have also been launched in the Netherlands, 
where there has also been a shift away from final salary to career average DB 
schemes. In these schemes the annual accrual of future pension entitlements is pre-
determined (as in a DB plan) but the indexation of pension entitlements in retirement 




25 See for example Saving, Laurence J. Kotlikoff at www.econlib.org/library/Enc/Saving.html. Also see 
Precautionary saving and old-age provisions: Do subjective saving motive measures work?, Lothar Essig, 
University of Mannheim, August 2004 and Disentangling the Importance of the Precautionary Saving Motive, 
Arthur Kennickell and Annamaria Lusardi, November 2005. 
26 www.independent.ie/business/irish/boi-and--unions--strike--hybrid-pension--deal-1206142.html 
27 DWP publishes new research reports on hybrid pension schemes, Department for Work and Pensions, 2005, 
www.dwp.gov.uk/mediacentre/pressreleases/2005/aug/iad300805-hybpens.pdf  
28 Sharing risks: the Netherlands’ new approach to pensions, Eduard Ponds and Bart van Riel, 




In the UK, corporate sponsors of defined-benefit pension schemes have recently 
benefited from innovations in the financial markets, which have opened new 
opportunities for passing on longevity risk. For example, there is a growing market in 
pension risk transfer solutions, where companies can pass on all their risks, including 
longevity risk, and the responsibility of meeting them to a specialist third party pension 
solutions provider. This appears to provide a compromise for both sides, where 
members gain improved security through a bespoke and regulated insurance contract, 
while the sponsor company removes future pension uncertainties from its balance 
sheet and commercial consideration. 
 
However, though increasingly popular, the solutions have yet to show that they can 
help companies with creating a viable pension system for the future. Currently, the UK 
pension insurance market has been focussed on helping sponsors and trustees manage 
those liabilities that are already well constrained due to the scheme being closed to 
new members. Nevertheless, some of the recent innovations such as partial buyouts 
may help schemes create an ongoing defined benefit scheme system where the risk is 
transferred away in tranches over time, though this still leaves open the question of 
whether sponsors feel able to hold the longevity risk for the rest. 
 
The question is whether a greater understanding of future longevity trends would al-
low for more efficient, equitable and affordable arrangements. An interesting area of 
recent activity in the financial markets has been the attempt to separate out longevity 
risk on its own and see if that can be individually managed or hedged away. This could 
have far-reaching implications for corporate pension funds as they could theoretically 
continue to pay pensions while facing reduced financial risk from longevity increases 
should such a market develop. This could be an important step if a sustainable pension 
system for the future is to be created.
29 
 
The principal vehicle for longevity risk transfer proposed by the capital markets is a 
longevity swap. This allows the scheme to lock into an agreed level of future longevity, 
or to hedge against general trends in longevity experienced by the population as a 
whole through either offering limited downside protection or based on a “longevity 
index” as seen in JP Morgan's LifeMetrics index.
30 Others have also developed be-spoke 
longevity swap products, including through insurance structures for added security. 
These initiatives are all designed to parcel up mortality, allowing it to be traded and 
giving pension schemes the opportunity to hedge their longevity risk outside of a 
buyout. All these developments help to price longevity risk, which should make it 
easier in the future to allocate the risk to the most appropriate agent. 
 
For pension schemes, the benefits are potentially attractive: it eliminates their most 
significant long-term risk, that of pensioners living longer; and mitigates the cost of 
more conservative longevity assumptions that may be required in the future, relieving 
pressure on the sponsor’s covenant. 
 
As part of the aforementioned reform efforts, governments have tried to deal with the 
issue of uncertainty by making their policies flexible and adapt automatically to future 
changes in longevity or other demographic developments. Sweden and Germany are 
widely recognised as having implemented innovative reforms to deal with this 
challenge. In 1998 the then Swedish government implemented a substantial pension 
reform, which included the introduction of a so-called annuity divisor and the so-called 
automatic balance mechanism. The former is updated for every new cohort of retirees 
to take into account the latest estimates of life expectancy. Everything else equal, as 
life expectancy rises; the divisor will reduce monthly annuity payments. This in turn 
should help to dampen future increases in state pension spending. The automatic 
balance mechanism is meant to guarantee the solvency of the Swedish pension system 
more generally by making automatic adjustments to inter alia the contribution rates. 
Over recent years Finland, Norway and other countries have introduced mechanisms 
 
29 The market has antecedents. The first bonds issued with a mortality element were issued in the 
Netherlands in 1670. In 1693, the British Government issued its own mortality bonds, the “Tontines” to help 
fund a war with France. 








As part of a wider reform package the then German government in 2003 introduced a 
so-called sustainability factor in its pension calculation formula with the aim of 
dampening future state pension increases. This factor ensures that future state pension 
adjustments will take into account future trends in the number of contributors to the 
state scheme and pensioners (which in turn also depends on longevity trends). As a 
result the pension adjustment might turn out to be significantly smaller than the in-
crease in average earnings (which remains the baseline) and could even reach zero 
without any further legislative changes.
32 
 
As a result of the reforms at least some part of the longevity risk will be shared 
automatically between the government and individuals. While this might help to ensure 
the sustainability of the public finances over the longer term, are these individuals, and 
in particular those who are already retired and therefore no longer in the labour 
market, well placed to deal with this risk sharing? Would a greater understanding of 
future longevity trends allow governments to design more efficient, equitable and 
affordable pension systems?





Finnish and Norwegian Pension Reform Implications for Preparing Aged Society, Ismo Risku and Mika Vidlund, 
Finnish Centre for Pensions, Working Paper 4, 2008 (www.etk.fi/Binary.aspx?Section=41096&Item=62970). 
Other countries include Canada and Japan. See Automatic balance mechanisms in pay-as-you-go pension 
systems, Carlos Vidal-Meliá, María del Carmen Boado-Penas and Ole Settergren, 2008 
(http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1132686). 
32 More information on the automatic stabilisers in the Swedish and German pension systems can be found in 
Building Automatic Solvency into U.S. Social Security: Insights from Sweden and Germany, James C. Capretta, 
The Brookings Institution, Policy Brief 151, March 2006. Further information on the pension systems more 
generally can found in Pension Schemes and Projection Models in the EU-25 Member States, Economic Policy 
Committee, November 2007 (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/documents/2007/pensions_en.pdf). In 
2007 the German government implemented further reforms, including an increase in the official pension age from 
65 years now to 67 years by 2029. 






Unlike the previous Swedish and German pension reforms, the 2007 reforms in the UK 
do not contain any automatic mechanisms, which could help to dampen future 
increases in state pension spending.
34 While the centre piece of the reform is the 
introduction of the so-called personal accounts in 2012, the reform also includes an 
increase in the state pension age from 65 years in 2020 to 68 years by the mid 2040s 
(in line with assumed longevity increases). Furthermore, state pension increases will be 
indexed to earnings rather than prices from 2012 onwards. At the time of the re-form, 
the British government argued that the policy measures would be fiscally sustainable 
over the long term. However, will they also be fiscally sustainable should the actual 
increases in life expectancy exceed those assumed at the time of the reforms? 
 
34 www.dwp.gov.uk/pensionsreform/. 
Box 1: Allocating longevity risk 
In  most  countries  the  (re)allocation  of  longevity  risk  has  been  a  gradual 
process. Starting in the mid 1990s governments in many developed countries 
concluded  that  without  reforms  their  often  generous  state  pension  systems 
would  become  fiscally  unaffordable  in  the  decades  ahead.  Governments 
responded to this challenge by announcing future increases in the pension age 
and by reducing the generosity of their future pension promises. To ensure the 
adequacy  of  future  pensioner  incomes,  governments  also  promoted 
occupational  and  personal  pensions.  As  argued  in  the  main  text,  several 
governments also introduced mechanisms, which would automatically share the 
financial  burden  arising  from  unexpected  increases  in  longevity  between  the 
state  and  the  individual.  These  policies  have  led  to  an  explicit  and  implicit 
reallocation of the longevity risk. 
 
In  a  number  of  countries  –  including  the  UK  –  the  private  sector  has 
traditionally played a crucial part in the provision of pensions. Faced with rising 
longevity (and the uncertainty of future longevity increases), businesses have 
inter alia tried to shift the longevity risk to their employees (shift from DB to 
DC,  closure  of  schemes).  More  recently,  pension  fund  trustees  and  their 
corporate sponsors have looked at the financial sector to provide solutions to 
dealing with longevity risk. It needs to be seen whether the emerging allocation 
of longevity risk will be perceived to be efficient, equitable and sustainable in 
the  longer  term.  If  not,  it  is  possible  that  the  electorate  will  give  future 
governments the mandate to initiate further adjustments. 
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Conversely, what will the British government do should future improvements in life 
expectancy in fact turn out to be more modest than assumed? The lack of in-built 
flexibility means that any potential future policy changes will require future 
governments to re-open the pensions debate, which would likely be time consuming 





Table 1 summarises some of the main demographic trends in selected countries over 
the coming decades. 
 










5  2005  2030  2050  2005  2030  2050 
Australia  1.79  1.85  1.85  78.9  82  84.1  19  35  41 
Brazil  2.25  1.92  1.85  68.8  73.1  76  9  19  31 
China  1.73  1.85  1.85  71.3  74.8  77.4  11  24  39 
Germany  1.36  1.54  1.74  76.5  79.1  81.4  28  46  54 
France  1.89  1.85  1.85  77.1  79.6  81.8  25  38  45 
India  2.81  1.97  1.85  63.2  69.3  73.4  8  13  21 
Italy  1.38  1.54  1.74  77.5  79.9  82.1  30  44  60 
Japan  1.27  1.4  1.6  79  81.5  83.3  30  52  74 
Mexico  2.21  1.85  1.85  73.7  77.2  78.9  9  18  34 
Russia  1.34  1.51  1.71  59  64  68.5  19  28  39 
South 
Africa 
2.64  2.13  1.85  48.8  55.3  61.2  7  12  14 
UAE  2.31  1.95  1.85  77.2  79.6  81.9  1  6  27 
UK  1.82  1.85  1.85  77.2  79.6  81.9  24  35  40 
USA  2.02  1.85  1.85  75.6  77.9  80.4  18  31  34 
1 Life expectancy at birth, males. The overall trend is similar for females. 
2 This is 
defined as the number of people aged 65 years and over as a share of those people 




Source: United Nations World Population Prospects 2007. 
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